INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyse the impact of board structure changes on the performance of the Ghanaian listed firms. The Ghanaian listed firms have recently adopted corporate governance guidelines on best practices (hereafter the Ghanaian Code) and are expected to comply or provide an explanation for non-compliance with the code provisions. Although compliance is not backed by the force of law as in the case of the UK and South African codes, it has provided a number of recommendations on governance best practices, including role separation between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the board of directors, board size ranging from eight to sixteen members, a balance of executive and nonexecutive directors with at least one-third of independent directors on the board and the establishment of board committees (both audit and remuneration).
Despite the objective of these codes being underpinned by agency theory aligning the shareholders' and managers' interests, prior studies on the relationship between board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance is inconclusive. One stream of empirical papers has indicated that corporate governance is positively associated with firm performance whereas others have found a negative or no relationship between the two. The empirical papers that reported a positive relationship are based on the aspect of agency theory that implies efficient board structures can significantly minimise agency costs with the consequential effect on firm performance. First, Rechner and Dalton (1991) showed that firms with separate board chairpersons consistently outperformed those with the combined role or CEO duality for large US corporations. Similarly, Adams and Mehran (2012) , as well as Meyer and Wet (2013) , observed a statistically significant and positive association between board size and firm performance. Cho and Kim (2007) reported that the rate of outside directors' participation is significant and positively related to firm performance. Laing and Weir (1999) found that the presence of audit and remuneration committees do have a positive impact on firm performance. Recently, Soliman et al (2014) found a positive association between role separation, board size, board independence, audit committee and firm performance.
In contrast, other studies have found a negative relationship between these board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance. In particular, Donaldson and Davis (1991) observed that firms with the combined roles of the CEO and the Chairman or CEO duality perform better than those that separate the two roles. Similarly, Dey et al (2011) discovered that firms that split the CEO and Chairman roles due to investors' pressure have significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent performance, and lower contribution to shareholder wealth. Yarmack (1996) reported that board size is negatively related to firm performance, evidence supported by Eisenberg et al (1998) and Guest (2009) . Bozec (2005) found that the proportion of outside representation on the board and the presence of audit committees are negatively related to firm performance.
The third stream of researchers found no relationship between these board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance. Chen et al (2008) , for example, documented an increased number of firms changing from dual to non-dual but their findings do not show any significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance nor improvement in firm performance after a change of leadership structure. Wintoki et al (2012) found no causal relationship between board size and firm performance after reexamining a larger sample of US firms. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) observed that the representation of outsider directors has no impact on firm performance. Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) found no statistically significant differences in firm performance between boards with audit and remuneration committees and those that do not have such committees.
Although the relationship between board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance are still not conclusive, evidence on the pre and post-adoption of a particular code impact on firm performance is still limited. In the UK, Weir and Laing (2000) analysed the relationship between board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance for two years, 1992 (pre-1992 Cadbury report) and 1995 (post-1992 Cadbury report) but documented mixed evidence. They found a significant and consistent negative relationship between outside directors and firm performance during both sub-periods. However, they found the presence of a remuneration committee to have no impact on firm performance during the pre-1992 Cadbury Report, but a positive and significant impact on firm performance during the post-1992 Cadbury Report. On the other hand, Bhagat and Bolton (2009), using US firm data, separated their sample into pre and post 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (S-Ox) to investigate how governance-performance relationship might have been impacted by the Act. They reported a negative and significant relationship between board independence and operating performance during the pre-2002 period, but a positive and significant relationship during the post-2002 period.
Ghana, a developing country was selected because, from an institutional perspective, it differs significantly from the two developed countries (UK and US) noted above. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study in any developing countries that has examined board structure changes impact on firm performance before and after the introduction of a code of corporate governance. We, therefore, add to the literature by investigating the extent to which board structure recommendations made by the Ghanaian Code have affected firm performance. In this respect, we assess the relationship between board structure governance mechanisms and firm performance for two sub-periods across Ghanaian Unlike Weir and Laing (2000) , we use panel data drawn from annual reports published by the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) listed firms over a ten-year period from 2000 to 2009. We explicitly separate the data into two distinct periods: pre-2003 and post-2003, thus to enable us to capture the changing corporate governance landscape. Given the panel nature of our data, we use a panel regression model to find whether firm performance might have been impacted by the board structure changes. We find evidence to suggest that duality is statistically significant and negatively related to firm performance pre-2003, but those firms that separate the two posts in line with the recommendations of the Ghanaian Code did not perform better than those that combined the two post-2003. While we find no relationship between board committees and firm performance pre-2003, the relationship switched to statistically significant post-2003. The most consistent result we find concerns board size. However, the non-executive director representation on the board appears to have no impact on firm performance. Our results over the whole period, 2000-2009 show that duality, board size and board committees explain some of the changes in firm performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent corporate governance reforms in Ghana, reviews the relevant studies and develops a series of hypotheses for testing. Section 3 describes the sample, variables and the model used in our empirical analysis reported in section 4. Finally, we provide concluding remarks and some suggestion for future research in section 5.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Agency theory
This paper's theoretical basis is founded on agency theory and in this context we clarify the development of the rationale for an application in the corporate governance landscape. Although not naming the problem, Berle and Means (1932) , can be identified as a logical starting point; they elaborated on the structure of the modern corporation whilst identifying the paradox of the shareholders as 'masters', yet ceding control and oversight to management. Essentially, dispersed ownership as it was in the US context meant that shareholders owning a portfolio of shares were unlikely to be concerned with the day to day operations of the corporation. Therefore it provides management with a possible incentive, and most definite opportunity, to serve their best interest instead of the shareholders.
The conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) emanated from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932 ) has led to the notorious agency problem. Fundamental to the agency problem is lack of monitoring and accountability, something which agency theory tries to address through board structure governance mechanisms such as the leadership role separation, optimum board size, non-executive directors representation, audit, and remuneration committees to realign the interests of shareholders and managers. The theory has impacted on the development of corporate governance codes around the world, and in 2003, the SECG published the Ghanaian version and encouraged firms to comply with its recommendations or provide an explanation for non-compliance. We argue that the introduction of the Ghanaian Code should lead to board structure changes, hence effective monitoring and accountability with a consequential effect on superior firm performance.
Board leadership structure (CEO duality)
The agency theory position is that CEO duality is bad because having the CEO as the Chairman of the board to evaluate his/her own work defeats the objective of having the board to monitor management leading to accountability failure. This is because the CEO may use his/her power as a board Chairman to select directors who are not expected to challenge his/her actions (Westphal and Zajac, 1995) . In this respect, the board will be incapable of effectively monitoring and evaluating the CEO's actions because the CEO duality 'signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control' (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.314) . This suggests that a board controlled by the CEO is expected to lack independence which may lead to more agency problems, and eventually, poor firm performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993 ). This problem is addressed by the UK and the South African codes which recommend that the roles of the CEO and the Chairman should be separated. The Ghanaian Code also recommends a similar leadership structure. In fact, there is likely to be lack of independence between the board and management if one person occupies the two roles.
The empirical evidence of whether CEO duality is better than separating the two roles in enhancing firm performance is mixed. First, and as in line with the agency theory, many prior studies have found a negative impact of CEO duality on firm performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1991 However, and consistent with the agency theory, the Ghanaian Code does recommend the separation of the two roles as best practice. This may be seen to be more effective in terms of enhancing firm performance and also to limit the power of the CEO of monitoring the monitors. Arguably, prior CEO duality-performance relationship evidence among listed firms in Ghana is limited to governance data from a questionnaire survey (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006) which might not reflect the actual governance practices by the Ghanaian firms over a longer period. Given that no research to date has examined the impact of the Ghanaian Code recommendation of the changes in role separation on firm performance, the first relevant hypothesis is operationalised in the following form:
H1: There is a statistically significant negative relationship between a combined leadership structure and firm performance.
Board size
Lipton and Lorch (1992) and Jensen (1993) are of the view that although larger board size initially assists keyboard functions, it comes to a point when larger boards suffer from coordination and communication problems and therefore board effectiveness deteriorates. Prior studies have found some mixed results on the relationship between board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996 Yermack (1996) that board size is negatively related to firm performance. In particular, Eisenberg et al (1998) criticised Yermack (1996) for mainly focusing on large firms, and for that matter, his findings cannot be extended to smaller firms, as well as those firms operating in different legal and cultural environments. In this respect, Eisenberg et al (1998) investigated the relationship between board size and firm performance across 879 small and medium size firms in Finland from 1992 to 1994. In line with Yermack (1996) , they reported a statistically significant and negative relationship between board size and firm performance.
In contrast, other studies ( 
Board independence
Given the agency theory proposition that boards dominated by executive directors (insiders) are not accountable to shareholders (Fama, 1980; Sonnenfeld; 2002) , the presence of non-executive directors on the board with their different expertise enhances board decision making process through their independent mind and judgment (Cadbury, 1992) . Notwithstanding the important role that the presence of non-executive directors plays in reducing the agency problems, evidence on the relationship between board independence and firm performance is mixed (Pearce and Zahra, 1992 Wintoki et al, 2012 ) also suggest that the presence of outside directors on the board has no effect on firm performance.
Despite the inconclusive evidence, the Ghanaian Code recommends a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board to monitor the activities of management. This means that the inclusion of non-executive directors on the board should, therefore, ensure effective monitoring of the executive directors whose interests are not aligned with shareholders value maximisation. Conyon and Peck (1998) argued that if outside directors either hold no shares or hold an insignificant number of shares, their motivation to monitor the executive directors, and therefore defend the shareholder interests may be immaterial. This is particularly important because the existence of the board as the most effective internal control mechanism for monitoring the executive directors' behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983) may not be achieved. Given that a high proportion of non-executive directors with little or no shareholdings suggest weak monitoring, the third relevant hypothesis is operationalised in the following form:
H3: There is a statistically significant negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and firm performance.
. Board committees
The impact of the presence of board committees on firm performance is still not clear as the research in this area is at its emergent stage (Dalton et al, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999) . However, and given the important functions of the board committees in an attempt to help reduce the agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932) 
RESEARCH DESIGN
92% of all listed firms traded on the GSE as at the period under consideration, bringing together 283 firm-year observations. Based on the Ghanaian Code provisions, the board structure variables include CEO duality (DUALITY), board size (BODSIZE), board independence (BODINDP), audit committee (AUCOM) and remuneration committee (RECOM) which are defined in Table 1 . The firm performance measures we use are return on assets (ROA); defined as operating profit after tax divided by the book value of total assets, and return on equity (ROE) defined as operating profit after tax divided by the book value of equity. Consistent with Samia et al (2011) who argue that ROA and ROE are short-term performance measures, we also use Tobin's Q (Q) defined as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where the market value of total assets is measured by the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008) to take account of the long-term firm performance measure in our analysis. This is particularly important because of insiders (management) and outsiders (investors) value firm performance differently (Black et al, 2006) , hence, the accounting-based (ROA and ROE) and marketbased (Q) performance measures for our empirical analysis.
We
, we include gearing (GEAR) defined as the ratio of total debt to capital employed, where capital employed is the sum of total debt and equity; growth opportunities (GROWTH) defined as the percentage of the difference between the current year's of sales and previous year's of sales divided by the previous year's of sales of each firm; firm size (SIZE) defined as the natural log of the book value of a firm's total assets; institutional shareholdings (INSTHOLD) defined as the proportion of shares held by institutional shareholders in excess of 3% of total shareholding and managerial ownership (MGROWN) defined as the proportion of shares held by executive directors to the total shareholdings.
Yu (2008) is of the view that firms that are not actively followed by analysts or brokers or not audited by one of the Big 4 auditors try to always artificially improve their performance by manipulating their accounting numbers and abnormal accruals, hence, we control for the accounting regime which is the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (AIFRS) defined as a binary number 1 if the firm has adopted IFRS or 0 if otherwise, and earnings smoothing measures such as discretionary accruals (DAs) estimated using modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) -DAs j,t = (TAC j,t /TA j,t )−NA and audit quality (AUDITOR) defined as a binary number of 1 if the firm is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms or 0 if otherwise. We also include firm-specific dummy and year dummy variables.
Method of estimation
Most prior studies involving panel data in examining the association between board structure changes and firm performance turn to use ordinary least square (OLS) model or the alternative of the panel regression models (e.g. random effects or fixed effects) without testing to ensure consistent and efficient results. To achieve consistent and efficient results in this study, and unlike prior pre and post board structure-performance relationship studies (Weir and Laing, 2000; Bhagat and Bolton, 2009), we assess the suitability of the regression models before our empirical analysis. This makes our study different from prior pre and post studies in general and in particular the Ghanaian studies. We therefore employ Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test to enable us to differentiate between OLS and the options of random effects or fixed effects; and the Hausman (1978) specification test to distinguish between random effects and fixed effects regression models.
The Hausman specification test allows us to determine which panel regression model is appropriate for our empirical analysis. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is no correlation between the unique errors and the explanatory variables used in the regression model, suggesting a test of strict exogeneity. The decision is as follows: if there is no correlation between the unique errors and the explanatory variables, random effects regression model is suitable. Otherwise, use the fixed effects model if there is a correlation between the unique errors and the explanatory variables. Using ROA, ROE and Q as the firm performance measures in equations 1, the Hausman test gave X 2 of 27.32, 31.12 and 18.51 (p-value = 0.000, 0.000 and 0.000), suggesting that the hypothesis of no correlation between the unique errors and the board structures as explanatory variables is rejected, hence, fixed effects regression is considered suitable for our method of estimation. The following fixed effects regression model is therefore specified:
(1)
where, PERFORMANCE it is the dependent variable, which is measured using ROA, ROE or Q; is the overall intercept; is the board structure governance variables represented by the CEO duality (DUALITY), board size (BODSIZE), board independence (BODINDP), audit committee (AUCOM) and remuneration committee (RECOM), j, for firm i in year t; is a set of firm specific control variables, k, for firm i in year t; where k = 1 to m; is a vector of 9 dummy variables representing the 10 sample years; is the firm specific fixed effects, consisting of a vector of 34 dummy variables to represent the 35 sample firms; and is the unobserved error component. As previously operationalised, the hypotheses expectations in relation to board structure variables are summarised in Table 2 . 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
BODINDP is the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. RECOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. GEAR is the ratio of total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN is the % shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor.
Table 4 compares the differences in board structure variables across Ghanaian listed firms during the pre-Code and the post-Code sub-periods to enable us to investigate the extent to which there have been significant changes in the keyboard structure monitoring mechanisms. As Table 4 shows, CEO duality although experienced 2% decrease, the difference is not statistically significant. However, board size experienced significant decrease during the post-Code period from 9.03 to 8. 17 . This suggests that Ghanaian boards became smaller after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. Although the non-executive director representation on the board increase by 1% in postCode period, the difference is not statistically significant. More importantly, Table 4 indicates a significant increase in audit committees during the post-Code period from 33.30% to 85%. Similarly, a remuneration committee experienced a significant increase in the post-Code period from 16.70% to 32.50%. These suggest that two of the keyboard structure mechanisms experienced significant changes across Ghanaian listed firms after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. Table 5 presents the Pearson's correlation coefficients for the firm performance, board structure and control variables to determine the level of collinearity between the variables included in the analysis. As Table 5 demonstrates, there is no evidence of multicollinearity; hence, all the variables were included in each of the relevant regression models. Table 6 reports the fixed effect regression results for the impact of board structure variables on firm performance during the whole period from 2000 to 2009. A positive coefficient shows high firm performance and a negative coefficient low firm performance. As models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 6 show, duality is found to be statistically significant and negatively related to firm performance measured by return on assets, return on equity and Tobin's Q, suggesting that hypothesis 1 is supported. This is also consistent with prior researchers (e.g. Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) who argue that firms with the leadership structure combined tend to performance poorly as a result of implementing decisions which are in favour of the CEO's personal objectives relative to the shareholder value maximisation.
Results
However, there is a positive relationship between board size and all the three firm performance measures, indicating that hypothesis 2 is supported. Although the Ghanaian Code recommends board size to be in the range of 8 and 16, this evidence clearly demonstrates that smaller board size is optimal across Ghanaian listed firms. Contrary to hypothesis 3, non-executive director representation on the board has no impact on firm performance, evidence consistent with Daily and Dalton (1993) and Wintoki et al (2012) who reported similar findings. Consistent with hypothesis 4, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the establishment of board committees and all the firm performance measures. Table 7 present the results of the impact of board structure changes on firm performance. As Table 7 indicates, the BODCHANGE is statistically significant and positively related to all the firm performance measures, suggesting that the board structure changes influenced by the Ghanaian Code is associated with greater firm performance. These results, therefore, suggest that the code recommendations have improved the key board structure monitoring mechanisms in Ghana. this conjecture, we divide our sample into two subgroups and run regressions for each sub-group to determine the performance consequences of board structure changes prompted by the Ghanaian Code. Table 8 
is the return on assets. ROE is the return on equity. Q is the Tobin's Q. DUALITY is when the CEO and the Chairman posts are occupied by the same person. BODSIZE is the number of board members. BODINDP is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. AUCOM is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if a firm has an audit committee and 0 if not. RECOM is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 if a firm has a remuneration committee and 0 if not. GEAR is the ratio of total debt to capital employed. SIZE is the log of sales. MGROWN is the % shares held by the executive directors. INSTITSH is the total % shares held by institutions where the holding is greater than 3%. AIFRS is the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards. DAs is the discretionary accruals. AUDITOR is the Big 4 auditor.
Robustness test
We undertook additional analyses in an attempt to investigate how robust the results were to the problem of endogeneity and sectoral differences. In particular, the level of firm performance may determine board structure governance mechanisms rather than board structure governance mechanisms determining firm performance (Bozec et al, 2010 Tables 6 and 8 to address the problem of endogeneity but the results were similar to those reported earlier.
Second, the use of fixed effects regression model raises the concern of whether sectoral differences affect firm performance. Owusu and Weir (2016) report that there are seven industries across Ghanaian listed firms including finance, distribution, ICT, manufacturing, mining, agriculture, food, and beverage. To check the robustness of our results and following Gompers et al (2003) , we exclude the dummy variables representing the 10 sample years (time effect) from equation 1 and use the industry dummies to control for sectoral effects. We, therefore, repeated the regression models in Tables 6, 7 and 8 and included 6 dummy variables representing the 7 industries to control for sectoral effects. Overall, the results were qualitatively the same as those reported above.
CONCLUSION
This paper assesses the performance consequences of board structure changes across Ghanaian listed firms. We predict that the board structure changes prompted by the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 should lead to better firm performance. Using a sample of the Ghanaian listed firms from 2000 to 2009 and a panel data analytical framework, our results over the whole period (2000-2009) show duality is negatively related to firm performance but there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between board size, the establishment of board committees and firm performance.
We develop the analysis further to investigate how firm performance might have been impacted by board structure changes after the introduction of the Ghanaian Code. We find evidence to suggest that duality is statistically significant and negatively related to firm performance pre-2003, but those firms that separate the two posts did not perform better than those that combined the two post-2003. While we find no relationship between board committees and firm performance pre-2003, the relationship switched to statistically significant post-2003. The most consistent result we find concerns board size. However, the non-executive director representation on the board appears to have no impact on firm performance. These results show that not all board structure recommendations introduced by the Ghanaian Code are effective in achieving superior firm performance in Ghana.
Our results are important for Ghanaian listed firms and policymakers. For Ghanaian listed firms, the board size ranging from 8 to 9 and the establishment of board committees are value relevant. For policymakers, firms should be encouraged to implement board structure of between 8 and 9 if they are to achieve superior performance to the satisfaction of shareholders.
There are some limitations to this study which require consideration when interpreting the results. First, we use a sample of Ghanaian listed firms and therefore generalisation of the results should be limited to this category. Second, the accountingbased and the market-based performance measures used in this study are statistically significant and positively related to discretionary accruals showing that higher performance is influenced by earnings manipulation. Hence, a greater understanding of the board structure recommendations introduced by the Ghanaian Code in reducing earnings management may provide further insights into the effectiveness of board structure monitoring mechanisms. Also, future research could look into the board structure changes since 2009 and its impact on firm performance. This is of particular importance because a lot of changes might have occurred which could provide new insights on the board structureperformance relationship nexus. 
